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Younsub Jung
Speaking · advisory inquiries
Cases

Cases

This is not a list of things that went well. Each entry is written in the same format: the state it started from, what was changed, and what remained.

9Cases
9PoC
40+Large corporates · CVCs
C-01 Nine deep-tech companies to the responsible departments at large corporates…C-02 No references, so unable to bid on large projects …C-03 The product is ready, but mass-production design and sales channels…C-04 Which of the 33 companies lacks what…C-05 PoC in a market with a 6.8% collaboration rate…C-06 Sell-side I… written directly for a KOSDAQ-listed companyC-07 From a competition with 800 entries, 9…C-08 Built it myself, raised for it myself — the platf…C-09 제도가 된 제안, 서울형 오픈이노…
C-01 Open Innovation Cybersecurity · AI · Mobility 2025 · Ministry of SMEs and Startups · Lead PM

How 9 deep tech companies got in front of the right corporate teams

The technology was validated, but nobody knew which department or which role at the large corporation they had to meet. The founders had already handed out business cards at several events, and each time it ended with “we will take a look.”

What I did
  • We broke down the technologies of the 9 companies element by element and first built a pre-matching plan that named the specific department at each demand-side company
  • 각 사를 현장 방문해 1:1 컨설팅으로 제안 논리를 다시 썼습니다, 기술 설명이 아니라 상대 부서의 KPI 언어로
  • Designed the event as an 8-min tech pitch → 90-min 1:1 networking → 30-min open consultation, so people left with a next meeting rather than a business card
Results
  • All 9 companies matched 1:1 with large and mid-sized enterprises
  • 3 PoCs in discussion with a major telecom group, including 1 confirmed registration as a public-project partner
  • One company was connected to a Middle East capital review through a securities firm's overseas advisory line
What we learned here

Large corporations do not buy “good technology.” They buy something that will hit the responsible department’s targets for this year on its behalf. Matching does not start at the event venue; it starts with finding out the other department’s KPIs.

C-02 Growth Strategy Secondary batteries · immersion cooling · ESS 2023 · Gyeonggi Province · Lead PM

An energy company shut out of large projects for lack of references

They had the technology but no one who had “actually used it,” so they kept stalling at the threshold of large national projects. No references meant no projects, and no projects meant no references — a closed loop.

What I did
  • We selected 12 of 41 local companies and rewrote the selection criteria “to look at the same things the performance metrics look at”
  • We brought in 4 large manufacturing and finance corporations for a 90-minute group consultation, then locked 4 weeks of individual follow-up meetings into the schedule
  • Designed the collaboration as a joint project proposal rather than a technical validation
Results
  • Established a collaboration structure with a prototyping specialist
  • Selected for a KRW 9 billion R&D project (linked to an overseas new-city project)
  • 같은 프로그램에서 10개사 대상 20 matches, 투자유치 2 · 기술협업 11 · 사업협업 7
What we learned here

What a company with no references needs is not an introduction but a project to put its name on with you. Matching that only gets people in the room usually ends right there.

C-03 Growth Strategy Dental Medical Devices 2023 · Gyeonggi Province · Lead PM

A medical device company with a finished product but blocked on both mass-production design and sales channels

They had made it to a prototype but had no one to do the mass-production design, and cash was running down in the meantime. Even the founder had not decided whether to solve sales channels or design first.

What I did
  • We created a technical touchpoint with a large manufacturer that had design capability and connected them as a joint design engagement
  • We built the Demo Day panel from five VC · CVC · retail practitioners so that the review itself became a sales opportunity
  • Rewrote the IR materials from “technology explanation” to “post-mass-production cost and sales channels”
Results
  • Started joint design of an automatic impression material injector with a large manufacturer
  • Demo Day 1st place
  • Led afterwards to a separate open innovation program with the same corporate
What we learned here

A bottleneck in an early-stage company is usually two problems tangled together. Often just setting the order — which one to untie first — is enough for the rest to follow.

C-04 Policy Advisory Korean Medicine · Bio 2025 · Ministry of Health and Welfare · Lead PM

An industry where no one knew which of the 33 companies was missing what

The support programs ran every year, but there was no data on which company was stuck at which stage. So the same training was being given to everyone, every time.

What I did
  • A full survey of 33 companies → baseline diagnostics for 16 turned the bottleneck at each stage into data
  • Based on the diagnosis, we individually assigned two or more 1:1 consulting sessions to 13 companies
  • We invited four investment firms not as judges but as investment reviewers, so the pitches led to actual review
Results
  • IR pitches by 4 companies · Follow-up review with 4 VCs
  • 1 company: Minister of Health and Welfare Award (natural-product pharmaceuticals)
  • Stage-by-stage bottleneck data for the whole industry, left as the basis for next year's program design
What we learned here

Support programs fail to leave results not because the budget is small. It is because the selection criteria and the performance metrics are looking at different things.

C-05 Open Innovation Energy · Manufacturing Innovation · Technology Innovation 2023 · Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy · Lead PM

How we produced 6 PoCs in a market with a 6.8% collaboration rate

By Statistics Korea data, of 13,429 large, small and mid-sized companies in Korea, only 919 — 6.8% — were actually collaborating. The shared view across the industry was that there are plenty of events but nothing left over.

What I did
  • We reversed the order. Instead of gathering startups, we first analyzed which technologies the mid-sized enterprises wanted and which investment stages they were at
  • From that analysis we built a preliminary data matching proposal, sent it to the mid-sized companies first, and then brought the startups in
  • Split into 3 sessions in Seoul and 1 in Busan so regional companies could attend without travel costs
Results
  • IR by 32 companies → 6 PoCs · 3 business matches
  • Satisfaction 94% · 300+ cumulative attendees
  • The 78-company long-list remains a deal sourcing asset for later programs
What we learned here

Matching succeeds or fails not on the day of the event but on who you analyzed first. And open innovation results play out over 1 to 5 years. One-off events do not produce them.

C-06 Investment · M&A M&A · Valuation 2025 · In-house business · Directly executed

Sell-side IR written directly for a KOSDAQ-listed company

We reviewed a sale as the next step for a business we held. Using an advisory firm meant certain costs and uncertain results.

What I did
  • We first analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the acquisition target, then mapped where our business fills those weaknesses
  • I wrote the IR myself using comparable company valuation based on the market caps of listed peers
  • Pitched the executive team directly and handled roughly six months of due diligence
Results
  • Advanced to executive review at a KOSDAQ-listed company · due diligence completed
  • Separately, I ran 3 M&A deals end to end myself: target sourcing → due diligence → valuation and terms → contract → PMI
  • This experience became the basis for “what acquirers and investors actually look at” in IR coaching
What we learned here

Valuation is not a negotiating chip — it is the argument the other side has to take to their board. The job is not proving what your company is worth; it is giving them the reason they can justify that number.

C-07 Policy advisory Generative AI · public data 2025 · Gyeonggi Province · Lead PM

What 9 teams took away from a competition with 800 entries

Competitions usually end at the awards ceremony. Nothing connected was left for the teams after the prize.

What I did
  • Reviewed 800 applications nationwide, selected 9 teams, and attached 2–4 mentoring sessions per team from the moment of selection
  • We placed IR pitch coaching before the presentation evaluation so the review became the result of the rehearsal
  • Assigned practitioners from global big tech and large corporates as dedicated 1:1 mentors
Results
  • All 9 teams matched 1:1 with practitioners from global big tech and major corporations
  • Closed with a public evaluation joined by some 40 residents on the citizen review panel
  • Built a structure where the connection with mentors survives the award
What we learned here

The value of a competition isn't the prize money — it's the people who remain after the review. Without that built into the design, you can review 800 entries and be left with nothing.

C-08 Founding · Fundraising Team building platform 2016– · BeginMate Inc. · Founder

A platform I built myself and raised money for myself

“I can’t find people to build with” — I hit that problem myself first. This is not someone else’s case study; it is a stretch I went through.

What I did
  • 2 patents registered for a team formation system and a project transaction service
  • Secured Venture Business, Inno-Biz and corporate R&D center certifications
  • Raised investment from a fund backed by the Korea Fund of Funds, Ministry of SMEs and Startups (2019)
Results
  • 국내외 15,000여 개사 이용 · 회원 40,000 members
  • 누적 팀빌딩 매칭 8,000건
  • 직·간접 투자 15개사 중 코스닥 상장 엑싯 2건
What we learned here

Advice from someone who has raised money is different from advice from someone who hasn't. Whether you've heard the rejection reasons first-hand is the whole of IR coaching.

Platform metrics are BeginMate internal data, as of 2026.08

C-09 Public Advisory Startup Policy · Open Innovation Seoul Metropolitan Government · Advisor, Startup Subcommittee

제도가 된 제안, 서울형 오픈이노베이션

Until then, Seoul's startup support was largely a structure that looked only at startups. It was thorough about grants and space, but the large and mid-sized companies those startups had to meet in order to earn revenue were not part of the policy at all.

What I did
  • As an advisor on the Startup Subcommittee, I proposed “Seoul-style Open Innovation” as a program
  • I proposed a structure that treats both the demand side and the supply side as the target, not startups alone
  • The design called for pre-matching on data → PoC → follow-up, not an event-day handshake
Results
  • After the proposal, Seoul's open innovation programs widened in scope year after year
  • I stayed on the ground as an operator and speaker for Seoul and district programs
  • The matching structure written then became the default blueprint for closing PoCs in later MOTIE and MSS projects
What we learned here

Policy changes by redefining who it is for, not by raising the budget. Change one line — from “we support startups” to “we support the room where startups and corporates meet” — and the next year's program looks entirely different.

The expansion followed the proposal; I do not claim it as my achievement alone

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